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DISSECTING THE HYBRID RIGHTS EXCEPTION: SHOULD IT BE
EXPANDED OR REJECTED?
David L. Hudson, Jr.* and Emily H. Harvey**
I. INTRODUCTION
In the early 1960s, the Supreme Court of the United States adopted a
high level of protection for religious liberty claims.1 The Court applied a
version of strict scrutiny when evaluating governmental laws or regulations
that burdened an individual’s free exercise of religion.2 In 1990, the Supreme Court reversed decades of precedent and fundamentally changed the
meaning and application of the Free Exercise Clause. In Employment Division v. Smith, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, determined
that the Free Exercise Clause does not protect individuals from laws that do
not target specific religious beliefs or practices.3 However, Justice Scalia
offered an exception for cases involving “hybrid rights.”4
A “hybrid right” is one that involves both the Free Exercise Clause and
another constitutional right.5 In the twenty-three years since the Smith decision, state and federal courts have grappled with the meaning and application of the hybrid rights exception with no clarification from the Supreme
Court. In the process, lower courts have developed at least three general
approaches to hybrid rights—rejection, independent viability, and colorable
claim.6 In some cases, courts arguably have used a fourth approach called
the “cabining” approach, which limits application of hybrid rights to cases
closely resembling the cases distinguished by the Court in Smith.7

* J.D., Vanderbilt University; A.B., Duke University; Adjunct Professor of Law, First
Amendment, Vanderbilt Law School and the Nashville School of Law. He is a co-editor of
the Encyclopedia of the First Amendment (CQ Press, 2008) and the author of First Amendment: Freedom of Speech (Thomson Reuters, 2012).
** M.T.S., Vanderbilt University; J.D. candidate, Nashville School of Law (2016).
1.See generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963).
2. See generally Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398.
3. 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990).
4. See id. at 880–81.
5. Id. at 881–882.
6. Note, The Best of a Bad Lot: Compromise and Hybrid Religious Exemptions, 123
HARV. L. REV. 1494, 1495 (2010). .
7. Id.
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Many legal commentators and courts believe the federal circuits have
split on the issue of hybrid rights.8 However, an examination of case law
reveals that, regardless of the various approaches, the lower courts’ analyses
of hybrid rights claims sometimes differ in form, but rarely differ in substance. So, while many courts and legal commentators recognize at least
three approaches to hybrid rights, this article contends there can only be one
viable approach—rejection. This is so because, as Justice David Souter once
opined, the hybrid rights exception is “untenable.”9 This article contends
that religious liberty advocates should abandon the hybrid rights exception
and seek protection elsewhere.
Two paths have emerged to provide greater protection for religious liberty. The first involves recasting free exercise claims as free speech claims.
The second involves state and federal statutes that legislatively restore a
strict scrutiny, pre-Smith approach. This article will argue that, of the two
paths, free speech proves more promising.
Part II of this article discusses Employment Division v. Smith, and introduces the hybrid rights exception. It also reviews the backlash that followed the Smith decision and outlines the ways state and federal governments attempted to override it. Part III focuses on the failure of the hybrid
rights exception. It summarizes the lower courts’ responses and approaches
to hybrid rights. Then, it illustrates each approach by analyzing specific hybrid rights cases. These cases support the contention that courts accepting a
hybrid rights theory, in substance, look no different from courts that do not.
Finally, Part IV discusses four main advantages to seeking refuge under the
Free Speech Clause.
II. EMPLOYMENT DIVISION V. SMITH: THE HYBRID RIGHTS EXCEPTION
Understanding the hybrid rights exception requires an analysis of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith. It also requires
examining how the religious liberty community responded in full force to
the Smith decision. Part II.A will discuss the Smith decision and the hybrids
rights exception. Part II.B will discuss the backlash to the hybrid rights exception.

8. Id.
9. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 (1993)
(Souter, J., concurring).
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The Hybrid Rights Exception

Justice Scalia created the hybrid rights exception in Employment Division v. Smith.10 Alfred Smith and Galen Black worked as counselors for an
Oregon-based private drug and alcohol rehabilitation center. When they
ingested peyote as a part of a sacramental rite in the Native American
Church., the rehabilitation organization fired them for “misconduct.”11 Because peyote use is illegal, the state’s employment division found Mr. Smith
and Mr. Black ineligible for unemployment benefits.12
The two men sued, arguing that the denial of benefits violated their
free-exercise rights under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.13 The Supreme Court of the United States held that the Free
Exercise Clause would not protect them, because individuals have an obligation to comply with neutral laws of general applicability regardless of the
burden those laws place on their religious practices.14 Thus, the Court ruled
that Oregon did not have to grant a religious exemption in order to comply
with the federal constitution.15
In reaching its decision, the Court had to contend with a line of precedent that granted exemptions when neutral, generally applicable laws interfered with religious practice.16 For example, in three cases—Cantwell v.
Connecticut,17 Murdock v. Pennsylvania,18 and Follett v. McCormick19—
Jehovah’s Witnesses faced sanctions for violating solicitation ordinances
when they distributed religious materials door-to-door in residential neighborhoods. In each case, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment protected their activities.20
The Smith Court also distinguished Pierce v. Society of Sisters, a case
involving an Oregon law prohibiting parents from sending their children to
private schools.21 In Pierce, a private religious school sued state officials,
arguing that a law requiring that all children attend public school violated
parental rights under the Due Process Clause.22 The Court held that the law
10. 494 U.S. 872, 881(1990).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 876–77.
14. Id. at 879.
15. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879
16. Id. at 881.
17. Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 301–02 (1940).
18. Murdock v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 114–15 (1943).
19. Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 574 (1944).
20. Id. at 578; Murdock, 319 U.S. at 114–15; Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303. In Murdock, the
Court also found a violation of free speech. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 114–15.
21. 268 U.S. 510, 532 (1925).
22. Id.
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in question infringed on the right of parents to direct the religious upbringing and education of their children.23
Justice Scalia also had to contend with the formidable precedent of
Wisconsin v. Yoder, a decision in which the Court ruled that Amish parents
were entitled to a religious based exemption from a mandatory compulsory
education law.24 The parents sought an exemption because their religious
faith required them to withdraw their children from school in the eighth
grade.25 The Court decided Yoder on the same grounds as Pierce, holding
that the state needed to exempt Amish families from the law.26
The Smith Court noted that two other Jehovah’s Witness cases—West
Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette and Wooley v. Maynard—also involved free-exercise rights, though the Court decided them on free-speech
grounds.27 In Barnette, the Court reasoned that school officials could not
suspend the children of Jehovah’s Witnesses when they refused to salute the
American flag.28 The Barnettes taught their daughters saluting the flag was
tantamount to worshipping a graven image, a practice forbidden by the Bible.29 In Wooley, the Court held that the State of New Hampshire violated
the Constitution by imposing criminal sanctions on Jehovah’s Witnesses
when they covered the motto “Live Free or Die” on their license plates.30
The plaintiffs in Wooley contended that the motto contradicted their religious beliefs.31 The Court held in both cases that the First Amendment prohibited the government from compelling speech.32
The Court distinguished these cases by explaining that, unlike Smith,
these cases involved “hybrid rights,” the Free Exercise Clause working in
conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech,
freedom of the press, or parental rights.33 Mr. Smith and Mr. Black’s case,

23. Id. at 534–35. The Court stated, “[W]e think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children . . . .” Id.
24. 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972).
25. Id. at 207–08.
26. Id. at 234. The Court states, “[T]he Court’s holding in Pierce stands as a charter of
the rights of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their children.” Id. at 233.
27. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990).
28. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
29. Id. at 629.
30. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977).
31. Id. at 706–707.
32. Id. at 714; Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
33. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882. Justice O’Connor stated in her concurring opinion, “The
Court endeavors to escape from our decisions in Cantwell and Yoder by labeling them ‘hybrid’ decisions . . . but there is no denying that both cases expressly relied on the Free Exercise Clause . . . and that we have consistently regarded those cases as part of the mainstream
of our free exercise jurisprudence.” Id. at 896. So, one could argue the Court’s legal reason-
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the Court argued, did not “present such a hybrid situation,” because their
free exercise claim did not connect with any “communicative activity or
parental right.”34 The Court broadened its definition of “hybrid rights” by
suggesting that free exercise could also combine with other rights, such as
freedom of association.35 Thus, the Court distinguished a significant line of
religious liberty cases and simultaneously created an exception to its new
rule, known as the “hybrid rights” exception.36 Critics charged that Scalia’s
“use of precedent borders on fiction.”37
B.

The Hybrid Rights Exception Backlash: Statutory Exemptions and Protection Under State Constitutions

The Smith decision was controversial and the backlash was severe.38
Professor Garrett Epps explained that the case “sparked a nationwide outcry
by religious groups across the political and theological spectrum, and
spurred Congress to seek to overrule the decision not once but twice.”39
Congress responded by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA) in 1993.40 Contrary to the Smith rule, RFRA required the government to justify any law substantially burdening religious practice with a
compelling interest.41 A few years following RFRA’s enactment, however,
ing in this instance amounts to what at least one judge refers to as a “bit of interpretive jiggery-pokery.” See King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2501 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
34. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
35. Id.
36. The Court also had to contend with Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In that
case, the Court granted an exemption to an employee who likewise could not get unemployment benefits. Id. at 401–02. Her employer fired her because she would not work on the
Sabbath. Id. at 399. Under the Sherbert test, the government may not burden religious practice without a compelling interest. Id. at 403. The majority stated in Smith that Sherbert (unlike Smith) involved an unemployment benefits regime with a system of individual exemptions. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. Under those specific circumstances, the government could not
refuse to grant a religious exemption (in addition to others) without a compelling reason. Id.
Thus, the Smith Court distinguished Sherbert, thereby creating a second exception to the
Smith rule—the “Sherbert” exception. See Carol M. Kaplan, The Devil is in the Details:
Neutral, Generally Applicable Laws and Exceptions from Smith, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045,
1046 (2000).
37. William P. Marshall, Correspondence: Correspondence on Free Exercise Revisionism; In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 309 (1991).
38. Ryan S. Rummage, Book Note, In Combination: Using Hybrid Rights to Expand
Religious Liberty, 64 EMORY L.J. 1175, 1187 (2015).
39. GARRETT EPPS, THE STORY OF AL SMITH: THE FIRST AMENDMENT MEETS
GRANDFATHER PEYOTE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 477, 477–78 (ed. Michael C. Dorf,
New York, Thomson Reuters/Foundation Press, 2009).
40. Christopher Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAS, 55
S.D. L. REV. 466, 471 (2010).
41. Id. at 471–72.
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the Supreme Court struck it down as applied to the states.42 In response,
Congress enacted a narrower law known as the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).43 Under RLUIPA, Congress reinstated the compelling interest test when a law substantially burdened religious
practice, but only in the context of land use regulation and prisons.44
After Smith, ten state high courts examined free exercise claims under
their state constitutions and, contrary to the Smith Court, chose to apply a
heightened level of review.45 Additionally, Alabama amended its constitution to restore the compelling interest test in free exercise cases.46
At the same time, states also began enacting their own RFRAs.47 So far,
twenty-one states have enacted some version of the original RFRA passed
by Congress.48 In doing so, lawmakers hoped state RFRAs would provide
greater protection to religious litigants than the federal constitution.49 However, many courts interpret state RFRAs in a manner unfavorable to religious claimants.50 For example, under many state RFRAs, in order to obtain
strict scrutiny review, a litigant must show that the law in question places a
substantial burden on his or her free exercise right.51 This “substantial burden” test has become a difficult hurdle to clear.52 Consequently, RFRAs
have morphed into “the dog that has not barked.”53 Because RFRAs can be
weak protectors of religious liberty, some look to the hybrid rights exception
42. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533–34 (1997); Lund, supra note 40, at 471–
72.
43. Rummage, supra note 38, at 1188–89.
44. Id. at 1189. It is worth noting that litigants who have filed suit under RLUIPA have
been met with inconsistent results. In the prison context, courts disagree on the level of deference given to prison officials. Case Comment, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act—Religious Liberty—Holt v. Hobbs, 129 HARV. L. REV. 351, 358–59 (2015). In
the land use context, courts have split on the definition of “substantial burden.” Karla L.
Chafee & Dwight H. Merriam, Six Fact Patterns of Substantial Burden in RLUIPA: Lessons
for Potential Litigants, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 437, 439 (2009).
45. Paul Benjamin Linton, Religious Freedom and Defenses under State Constitutions, 7
U. ST. THOMAS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 186 (2013) (listing Alaska, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Washington, and Wisconsin).
46. Id. at 108.
47. Lund, supra note 40, at 474.
48. See 2015 State Religious Freedom Restoration Legislation, NATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/2015-staterfra-legislation.aspx (last visited August 7, 2016) (providing a list of the twenty-one states
that have passed RFRAs as of September 3, 2015).
49. Lund, supra note 40, at 475–76.
50. Id. at 485.
51. Id. at 477.
52. Id. at 488; see also Mark Strasser, Old Wine, Old Bottles, and Not Very New Corks:
On State RFRAS and Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 34 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 335, 359–60
(2015).
53. Lund, supra note 40, at 469.
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for protection.54 But, in a vast majority of cases, the hybrid rights exception
has not delivered on its promise.55
III. THE FAILURE OF AND THE RESPONSE TO THE HYBRID RIGHTS
EXCEPTION

The hybrid rights exception produced unanswered questions that lower
courts struggled to answer. As such, courts applied the hybrid rights exception differently. Part III.A discusses the failure of the hybrid rights exception, and Part III.B discusses the four approaches courts generally use when
applying the hybrid rights exception.
A.

The Failure of the Hybrid Rights Exception

In Smith, the Supreme Court left many unanswered questions concerning its hybrid rights exception:
(1) What types of companion claims can combine with a free exercise claim to form a hybrid?
(2) How strong must the companion claim be?
(3) If the court finds a hybrid right, should it apply strict scrutiny?56
Lower courts need broad, clearly articulated rules in order to create
“equality, efficiency, and predictability.”57 At the same time, litigants need
to know what to expect when they bring their claims.58 Lower courts and
litigants need answers. The Smith Court left them wanting.
Some legal commentators argue that the Smith Court never meant for
the hybrid rights exception to be a substantive one—that it “was not intend-

54. See Rummage, supra note 38, at 1188–89.
55. A thorough review of the case law on hybrid rights reveals only one successful hybrid rights claim at the appellate court level—a Supreme Court of Pennsylvania case. Shepp
v. Shepp, 906 A.2d 1165 (Pa. 2006). In that case, a trial court forbade a father from speaking
to his daughter about his religious beliefs concerning polygamy. Id. at 1168. The court found
a free exercise/parental rights hybrid sufficiently similar to Yoder to warrant strict scrutiny.
Id. at 1173.
56. See, e.g., Benjamin I. Siminou, Making Sense of Hybrid Rights: An Analysis of the
Nebraska Supreme Court’s Approach to the Hybrid-Rights Exception in Douglas County v.
Anaya, 85 NEB. L. REV. 311, 317–18 (2006).
57. The Best of a Bad Lot, supra note 6, at 1511.
58. Id.
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ed to be taken seriously.”59 But, as one federal district court judge lamented,
“[T]he language of Smith remains,” and a lower court must “give meaning
to the seemingly impenetrable hybrid-rights exception by applying the law
to the facts of cases before it.”60
Consequently, some courts have attempted to piece together a broad
principle that can be applied consistently in different cases.61 However,
“there is no feasible broad-rule approach to hybrid rights.”62 The most significant problem occurs when courts grapple with the strength of the companion claim.63 To this, Justice Souter reasoned, if the exception requires the
companion claim to be implicated, then the exception would “swallow the
Smith rule,” because the peyote-smoking ritual at issue in Smith implicated
two companion rights—freedom of speech and freedom of association.64 On
the other hand, if the hybrid rights exception requires the litigant to show a
violation of the companion right, then the free exercise claim becomes superfluous.65
B.

The Response to the Hybrid Rights Exception: Four Approaches to
Hybrid Rights

Most legal commentators have identified three main approaches to hybrid rights: (1) rejection; (2) independent viability; and (3) colorable claim.66
One might also argue a fourth approach—”cabining.”67 As the federal circuit
59. Bradley C. Johnson, Note, By Its Fruits Ye Know: Axson-Flynn v. Johnson: More
Rotted Fruit from Employment Division v. Smith, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1287, 1310 (2005).
Professor Michael McConnell believes the majority in Smith used hybrid rights “to reach the
conclusion it desired . . . without openly overruling any prior decisions.” The Best of a Bad
Lot, supra note 6, at 1497–98.
60. Hicks v. Halifax Bd. of Educ., 93 F.Supp.2d 649, 660–61 (E.D.N.C. 1999).
61. The Best of a Bad Lot, supra note 6, at 1511.
62. Id.
63. Church of the Lukumi Babulu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567
(1993) (Souter, J., concurring). So far, only the Third Circuit has addressed a free exercise/freedom of association hybrid. In that case, the Salvation Army sought an exemption
from a state statute regulating boarding houses. Salvation Army v. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs,
919 F.2d 183, 185 (3d. Cir. 1990). The court noted that the right to freedom of association
derived from the First Amendment and attached to either the expression of ideas (free speech)
or the exercise of religion (free exercise). Id. at 199. The right to free speech, the court explained, had “different contours than the right to free exercise of religion.” Id. The court then
reasoned, “[w]e would not expect a derivative right to receive greater protection than the
right from which it was derived.” Id.
64. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 567
65. Id.
66. The Best of a Bad Lot, supra note 6, at 1495.
67. Id. No court has used the “cabining” approach by name. At least one other commentator suggests a “genuine implication” approach. See Siminou, supra note 56, at 318. Under
this approach, the hybrid must consist of one of three companion claims—free speech, paren-
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courts of appeal split on the meaning and application of the hybrid rights
exception, some courts have implored the Supreme Court for clarification.68
But, the cases consistently reveal that, when a litigant brings a hybrid rights
claim before any court (regardless of the named approach), and the law in
question is neutral and generally applicable, the court will apply the same
basic analysis. Thus, one wonders if lower courts truly need the clarification
they seek.
For parental rights/free exercise hybrids, for example, the level of scrutiny depends entirely on its similarity to Yoder. If the case closely resembles
Yoder, the court will apply a heightened level of review. If not, the court
will apply Smith’s general rule to the free exercise claim. The foregoing
cases suggest this is true of courts that accept and courts that reject hybrid
rights.
For any other free exercise hybrid, most courts analyze the companion
right separately, applying relevant jurisprudence and tests. The level of scrutiny hinges entirely on the level of scrutiny required by the companion
claim. If the court finds a violation of the companion right, it usually
grounds its holding there.69 If not, the court applies Smith’s general rule to
the free exercise claim. Again, the case law suggests this is true of courts
that accept a hybrid rights theory and of those that do not. The following
subsections discuss the four possible approaches to hybrid rights and the
circuits that apply such approaches, beginning with the rejection approach.

tal rights, or freedom of association. Id. at 324. In addition, the challenged law must “genuinely implicate” the asserted companion right. Id. Siminou argues that some district courts
use this approach, focusing on the court’s hybrid rights analysis in Hicks v. The Halifax Bd.
of Educ. Id. at 325. This article contends the Hicks court’s analysis fits a “cabining” approach, as discussed later. Like the “cabining” approach, no court has used the “genuine
implication” approach by name. Id. at 326.
68. For example, the Ninth Circuit stated in an en banc decision, “Smith itself is fraught
with complexity both in doctrine and in practice . . . [p]erhaps the Supreme Court will have
an opportunity before this issue arises again in this circuit to refine its approach in this area . .
. .” Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1147–48 (9th Cir. 2000).
The Sixth Circuit stated, “therefore, at least until the Supreme Court holds that legal standards under the Free Exercise Clause vary depending on whether other constitutional rights are
implicated, we will not use a stricter legal standard than that used in Smith . . . .” Kissinger v.
Bd. of Trs., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993).
69. And, even if it does not ground its holding in the companion claim, it certainly
could. The free exercise analysis is often superfluous.
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The Rejection Approach: Some Courts Reject the Hybrid Rights
Exception

One approach to the hybrid rights exception is to reject it completely.
The Sixth, Second, and Third Circuits have adopted this approach.70 These
circuits apply Smith’s general rule to the free exercise claim, regardless of
any other rights asserted. However, should the facts of the case closely resemble Yoder, these courts have indicated they would apply a heightened
level of review. The following subsections discuss key decisions rejecting
the hybrid rights exception in each circuit.
a.

The Sixth Circuit: Kissinger v. Board of Trustees of Ohio
State University

While a student at the College of Veterinary Medicine at Ohio State
University, Jennifer Kissinger wanted to opt out of a required course in veterinary surgery, because healthy animals would be killed as part of the
class.71 Ms. Kissinger claimed this activity would violate her religious beliefs.72 When the university informed her she would need the course to graduate, Ms. Kissinger sued, claiming a violation of freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of association, equal protection, and due process.73
She contended the hybrid rights exception applied to her claim.74
The Sixth Circuit characterized the hybrid rights exception as “illogical,” explaining it made no sense that a state regulation would violate the
Free Exercise Clause only if it implicated other constitutional rights.75 The
court applied Smith’s general rule to Kissinger’s claim, finding the school’s
curriculum was generally applicable and neutral, with no system of particularized exemptions.76 Therefore, the school did not violate Ms. Kissinger’s
free exercise right when it refused to grant her an exemption.77 The court
also distinguished Ms. Kissinger’s claim from Yoder (though her claim did
not involve parental rights) noting that, unlike the Amish families in Yoder,

70. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has yet to address the
hybrid rights exception, but a district court in the Eleventh Circuit rejected it. See Warner v.
City of Boca Raton, 64 F.Supp.2d 1272, 1288, n.12 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
71. Kissinger v. Bd. of Tr. of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 178 (6th Cir. 1993).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 179. The parties reached a settlement, but the district court refused to award
Ms. Kissinger any attorney’s fees. Id. at 178. Thus, Ms. Kissinger appealed. Id.
74. Id. at 180.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 179.
77. Kissinger, 5 F.3d. at 178. The court would not award Ms. Kissinger any attorney’s
fees. Id.
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the government did not compel Ms. Kissinger to attend veterinary school.78
She willingly enrolled knowing the school would require her to take the
surgery course.79
b.

The Second Circuit: Leebaert v. Harrington

In Leebaert v. Harrington, the Second Circuit also declined to recognize the hybrid rights exception.80 Mr. Leebaert argued that the government
infringed on his constitutional right to direct the upbringing and education of
his son, Corky, by requiring that Corky attend a health education class.81 He
claimed the program ran counter to his religious beliefs about sex.82
Mr. Leebaert contended that the government’s action in this case warranted strict scrutiny because his claim (1) consisted of a parental rights/free
exercise hybrid; and (2) closely resembled Yoder.83 Though the court declined to recognize the hybrid rights exception, it applied Yoder to Leebaert’s claim, acknowledging that Yoder required a heightened level of review.84 However, unlike the Amish parents in Yoder, the government in
Leebaert’s case did not threaten his “entire way of life” by requiring
Corky’s participation in a health education class.85 Thus, Leebaert’s claim
did not receive heightened scrutiny.86
c.

The Third Circuit: McTernan v. City of York

Mr. McTernan stood in an alleyway at the back entrance of a Planned
Parenthood, distributing pro-life literature and talking to potential patrons
and staff.87 A police officer restricted access to the back entrance and threatened to arrest Mr. McTernan if he saw him lingering there.88 Mr. McTernan
sued, claiming the officer violated his First Amendment freedoms of speech,

78. Id. at 180–81.
79. Id.
80. 332 F.3d 134, 144 (2d Cir. 2003).
81. Id. at 137.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 139. Leebaert also argued a parent’s right to direct the education of his child is
“fundamental” under Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). Id. But, the court held this
parental right does not include the right to exempt one’s child from public school requirements. Id. at 141.
84. Id. at 144.
85. Id.
86. Leebaert, 332 F.3d at 144.
87. McTernan v. City of York, Pa., 564 F.3d 636, 641 (3d Cir. 2009).
88. Id. at 643.
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association, and religion.89 Mr. McTernan argued that the court should apply
strict scrutiny to his free exercise claim because it fit the hybrid rights exception.90
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also rejected
the hybrid rights exception.91 Instead, it applied Smith’s general rule to the
free exercise claim, and determined that, though the restriction was neutral,
a jury would need to decide if the officer applied the restriction in a general
manner.92 If so, the Free Exercise Clause would not protect Mr. McTernan’s
activities.93
As to Mr. McTernan’s free speech claim, the court held that the officer’s action was content neutral, which meant that the court would uphold
the restriction if it served a significant government interest and was narrowly tailored to serve that interest (intermediate scrutiny).94 Hence, if a jury
determined that the restriction was neutral and generally applicable under
the Free Exercise Clause, it would apply the level of review dictated by the
free speech claim.
2.

The Independent Viability Approach: Some Courts Permit a Hybrid Rights Exception, as Long as a Litigant Proves a Violation

Another approach to the hybrid rights exception is to focus attention on
the other constitutional claim. The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) and the Supreme Court of New
Mexico have adopted this method—called the independent viability approach.95 Under this approach, the free exercise claim could conceivably
connect with any constitutional right to form a hybrid.96 At the same time,
these courts require the plaintiff to prove that the government has violated
the companion right.97 The free exercise claim warrants strict scrutiny only
if the companion claim does.98 So, while these courts recognize a hybrid

89. Id. at 644. The court noted that, though McTernan referenced freedom of association, he did not argue it in his brief. Id. at 644, n.3. The court subsumed this claim into its free
speech analysis. Id.
90. Id. at 647, n.5.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 649.
93. McTernan, 564 F.3d at 649.
94. Id. at 652–53.
95. The Best of a Bad Lot, supra note 6, at 1500–01. This case comment discusses the
D.C. Circuit’s approach, but does not discuss the Supreme Court of New Mexico’s approach.
96. For example, the D.C. Circuit found a Free Exercise/Establishment Clause hybrid in
E.E.O.C. v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
97. Rummage, supra note 36, at 1193.
98. Id. at 1194.
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rights theory, they approach their cases no differently than the courts that
reject it.99
The Supreme Court of New Mexico recently decided a case illustrating
the independent viability approach as applied to a free exercise/free speech
hybrid.100 The D.C. Circuit, on the other hand, applied the approach to a
Free Exercise/Establishment Clause hybrid.101 In both cases, however, the
hybrid rights analysis did little to distinguish either court from the Sixth,
Second, or Third Circuits. The following sections discuss the key decisions
in the circuits adopting the independent viability approach.
a.

The Supreme Court of New Mexico: Elane Photography v.
Willock

The New Mexico Human Rights Act (NMHRA) prohibits businesses
providing public accommodations from discriminating against people based
on sexual orientation.102 Elane Photography refused to photograph a commitment ceremony between two women.103 It claimed the act, as applied,
violated its First Amendment free speech and free exercise rights.104 Further,
because Elane Photography raised both a free exercise and a compelled
speech claim, it argued hybrid rights.105
First, Elane Photography contended the NMHRA impermissibly compelled it to engage in expression that sent a positive message about same-sex
marriage.106 The Supreme Court of New Mexico reasoned that the NMHRA
did not require Elane Photography to recite or display any message.107 It did
not regulate the content of the photographs.108 Nor did it even require Elane
Photography to take photographs.109 The NMHRA merely stated that, if a
business chooses to operate as a public accommodation, it cannot discriminate against people based on sexual orientation.110
Elane Photography also argued that, by compelling it to photograph
same-sex weddings, observers would view it as approving same-sex marriage.111 The court disagreed, asserting that most observers do not assume a
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Elane Photography v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013).
Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455.
Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 58.
Id. at 59.
Id.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 64.
Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 64.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 68.
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wedding photographer shares the couple’s views on marriage, or any other
subject for that matter.112
Thus, the court did not find the free speech claim to be “independently
viable.”113 And, because the NMHRA was a neutral law of general applicability, the government did not violate Elane Photography’s free exercise
rights.114 “Elane Photography,” the court stated, “offers no analysis to explain why the two claims together should be greater than the sum of their
parts.”115 So, like the Third Circuit’s free exercise/free speech case, if the
law is neutral and generally applicable, the court will apply a heightened
level of review only if the free speech claim warrants it.
b.

The D.C. Circuit: E.E.O.C. v. Catholic University of America

Sister Elizabeth McDonough and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission sued Catholic University of America for engaging in sex discrimination, in violation of Title VII, when it denied her application for tenure in its Department of Canon Law.116 The E.E.O.C. argued that, because
Title VII was a neutral law of generally applicability, Catholic University
would have to comply.117
The court dismissed the E.E.O.C.’s claim for two primary reasons: (1)
Sister McDonough served as the functional equivalent of minister, which the
Free Exercise Clause forbids judicial review because of the ministerial exception;118 and (2) an intrusive investigation by the government into the tenure process for a theological appointment promoted excessive entanglement
between government and religion in violation of the Establishment
Clause.119 The court then held, in the alternative, that the case presented a
Free Exercise/Establishment Clause “hybrid situation,” which would permit

112. Id. at 69.
113. Id. at 75.
114. Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 75.
115. Id. at 75–76. The court also complained that Elane Photography did not properly
brief the hybrid rights claim. Id. at 75. One legal commentator argues that the Supreme
Court’s failure to adequately address the hybrid rights exception creates a “trifurcated problem” for litigants: (1) Litigants fail to fully brief their claims; (2) some courts will not address
or adjudicate hybrid claims without further guidance from the Supreme Court; and (3) qualified immunity often prevents litigants from obtaining damages in free exercise cases. Rummage, supra note 38, at 1197.
116. E.E.O.C. v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d at 457 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
117. Id. at 461–62.
118. The ministerial exception to the Free Exercise Clause exempts the selection and
employment of clergy from Title VII and similar statutes. Id. Therefore, under the ministerial
exception, courts will not decide employment discrimination suits by ministers against the
religious institutions that employ them. Id.
119. Id. at 457.
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the court to find a violation of the Free Exercise Clause, even if the court
was wrong about the ministerial exception.120
Many legal commentators believe the D.C. Circuit took an independent
viability approach because it required a violation of the companion claim
(the Establishment Clause), before finding a free exercise hybrid121 (though
one could argue the court took no position because it applied the hybrid
rights exception in an alternative holding).122 Even without the Free Exercise
Clause, however, the court found in favor of Catholic University, because
the E.E.O.C. failed the Lemon test.123 Thus, the hybrid rights analysis did
little to distinguish the D.C. Circuit from the other analyses.124
3.

The Colorable Claim Approach: Some Courts Permit a Hybrid
Rights Exception Without Requiring a Litigant to Prove a Violation

In an attempt to avoid this problem, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have
developed the colorable claim approach.125 Like the independent viability
approach, under this approach, any constitutional right can combine with the
free exercise claim to form a hybrid.126 However, unlike the independent
viability approach, the litigant does not have to prove the violation.127 A
colorable claim determination is similar to a “likelihood of success on the
merits” analysis for preliminary injunctions.128 The requisite strength of the
120. Id. at 467.
121. The Best of a Bad Lot, supra note 6, at 1501.
122. Id. Subsequent cases reveal the D.C. Circuit has adopted an independent viability
approach. See Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“The combination of
two untenable claims equals a tenable one.”); Mahoney v. District of Columbia, 662
F.Supp.2d 74, 95, n.12 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Plaintiffs may not, however, raise a ‘hybrid claim,’
because they do not have an independently viable claim under the Speech Clause.”).
123. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d at 470; see also The Best of a Bad Lot, supra note 6,
at 1501.
124. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d at 467; see also The Best of a Bad Lot, supra note 6,
at 1502.
125. Rummage, supra note 38, at 1195. At least one case suggests the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is open to the colorable claim approach. Cornerstone
Christian Sch. v. Univ. Interscholastic League, 563 F.3d 127, 136, n.8 (5th Cir. 2009). In
Cornerstone, the plaintiffs did not ask the court to apply the hybrid rights exception, but did
allege a violation of their free exercise and parental rights under Yoder. Id. After discussing
the claim’s dissimilarity to Yoder, the court explained it would not apply the hybrid rights
exception, because the Plaintiffs did not present a “colorable claim” for a violation of either
their free exercise or their due process rights. Id.
126. Rummage, supra note 38, at 1210.
127. See id. at 1195.
128. See id. at 1198–99; see also Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d
692, 706 (9th Cir. 1999), reh’g granted, opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999),
and on reh’g, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).
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companion claim ostensibly falls somewhere between the two extremes—it
requires more than mere implication, but less than independent viability.129
Thus, if a litigant establishes a fair probability of success for the companion claim, and the plaintiff can couple that claim with a free exercise
right, the court will apply strict scrutiny.130 However, a litigant without a
free exercise claim would need to prove a violation.131 Because this kind of
analysis favors religious claimants, it raises Equal Protection and Establishment Clause concerns.132
In practice, however, the colorable claim approach looks no different
than the independent viability approach.133 Though a colorable claim court
says it is determining a companion claim’s “likelihood of success on the
merits,” it actually analyzes the claim much like courts that require independent viability.134 As one critic observed, “it is difficult for a court to analyze a constitutional claim only halfway,” especially when it has all of the
essential facts.135 So, the colorable claim approach runs into the same problems as the independent viability approach in that the exception becomes
superfluous to the analysis.136 This analytical flaw appears most clearly in a
recent Tenth Circuit case.137
a.

The Tenth Circuit: Axson-Flynn v. Johnson

Christina Axson-Flynn enrolled in the University of Utah’s Actor
Training Program (“ATP”).138 Because Axson-Flynn is Mormon she refused
to say “fuck” or “God damn” during classroom exercises.139 Axson-Flynn
wanted to substitute other words for the offensive ones, but a faculty member told her to “get over” it.140 The faculty never ordered Axson-Flynn to
leave the program, but she assumed they would eventually force her out.141
Thus, Axson-Flynn filed a lawsuit, claiming the school violated her free

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Thomas, 165 F.3d at 705.
See The Best of a Bad Lot, supra note 6, at 1506.
See id.
Id. at 1511.
Johnson, supra note 59, at 1312.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 1312–13.
Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir. 2004).
Id.
See id.
Id.
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speech and free exercise rights.142 She contended her claim fit the hybrid
rights exception.143
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit first examined her free speech claim.144 Because the speech in question was schoolsponsored speech, the court applied the Hazelwood test.145 Under Hazelwood, the school’s restriction on speech or press only had to be “reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns”—a form of rational basis review.146 The school justified its restriction as a methodology for preparing
students for careers in acting.147
The court found that, though this methodology was not necessary to the
program’s pedagogical goal, it was reasonably related to it.148 However,
Axson-Flynn countered that the proffered goal served as a pretext for an
ulterior motive—religious discrimination.149 The court decided to remand
the free speech claim for further fact finding, because it could not determine,
from the facts before it, if the claim had “a fair probability or likelihood, but
not certitude, of success on the merits.”150
Thus, even with a lower threshold requirement for the companion
claim, the court required the government to fail rational basis review before
it would apply strict scrutiny to the free exercise claim. So, the Tenth Circuit
falls into the same trap as a court applying the independent viability approach, and the hybrid rights exception becomes pointless to the analysis.
This analytical flaw is apparent even when the free exercise hybrid consists
of companion rights other than free speech, as evidenced by a Ninth Circuit
case, Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1294–95.
144. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1283.
145. Id. at 1285.
146. Id. at 1289.
147. Id. at 1291.
148. Id. at 1292.
149. Id. at 1293.
150. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1297. The court ultimately decided it would not remand
the case on the hybrid rights issue, because the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 1297. When determining whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity,
courts engage in a two-step inquiry: (1) did the defendant violate the plaintiff’s constitutional
rights; and (2) was the law clearly defined at the time of the violation? John C. Williams,
Qualifying Qualified Immunity, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1298 (2012). In Axson-Flynn, the
court held the hybrid rights exception was not clearly defined at the time of the defendants’
actions. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1301. A more recent Supreme Court case further exacerbates the problem that qualified immunity creates for hybrid rights litigants. In Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009), the Supreme Court of the United States held that courts could
answer the clarity question without reaching the constitutional issue. Williams, Qualifying
Qualified Immunity, at 1299. Thus, the doctrine of qualified immunity may preclude further
development of the hybrid rights exception, since courts no longer have to determine if the
government violated a constitutional right. Id.
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The Ninth Circuit: Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights
Commission

Kevin Thomas and Joyce Baker owned residential rental properties in
Anchorage, Alaska.151 Both the state and city passed laws forbidding discrimination in rental housing based on marital status. Thomas and Baker,
avowed Christians, believed it was a sin for unmarried couples to cohabitate,
and refused to rent to them.152 They sued the Anchorage Equal Rights
Commission (“AERA”), claiming a violation of their free exercise rights.153
The AERA argued that, because the law was neutral and generally applicable, the plaintiffs would have to comply with the law, regardless of the burden it placed on their free exercise right.154 To the contrary, Thomas and
Baker insisted the hybrid rights exception applied, because the law also violated their Fifth Amendment eminent domain and First Amendment freespeech rights.155
The court first applied the requisite three-factor test to determine if the
law, in effect, operated as a regulatory taking in violation of the Fifth
Amendment.156 The court considered the economic impact of the regulation,
the interference with investment-backed expectations, and the character of
the action.157 Citing Supreme Court precedent, the court concluded that,
though the law had no economic impact on the plaintiffs, it sufficiently interfered with their dominion and possession to qualify as a regulatory taking.158 Therefore, the court held that the Fifth Amendment claim was “colorable.”159
The court then addressed the free speech allegation.160 The plaintiffs
pointed to provisions in the law that forbade them from making “a written or
oral inquiry or record” of the marital status of a prospective renter, or to
“‘represent to a person that real property is not available for inspection, sale,
rental, or lease’ on the basis of the lessee’s marital status.”161 Applying relevant free speech jurisprudence, the court determined that the speech in ques151. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692, 696 (9th Cir. 1999),
reh’g granted, opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999), and on reh’g, 220 F.3d
1134 (9th Cir. 2000).
152. Id. at 696–97.
153. Id. at 697.
154. Id. at 702.
155. Id. The court overturned this decision, en banc. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal
Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1137 (9th Cir. 2000).
156. Thomas, 165 F.3d. 692, 708.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 709.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 702.
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tion was not commercial speech subject to intermediate scrutiny, but pure
religious speech, subject to strict scrutiny.162
Because the court found both the Fifth Amendment and First Amendment free speech claims colorable (and thus likely to succeed), it applied
strict scrutiny to the free exercise claim (though it could have reached the
same result by applying strict scrutiny to the free speech claim without reference to the free exercise claim).163 Applying strict scrutiny, the court determined that Alaska’s interest in preventing marital status discrimination
was not compelling, in large part because unmarried couples did not qualify
as a “suspect class.”164 At the same time, the law placed a substantial burden
on Thomas and Baker’s free exercise rights.165 Therefore, to comply with the
Constitution, the AERA would need to grant Thomas and Baker an exemption from the law.166
Despite trying to find a middle ground between implication and independent viability, one could argue that the Ninth Circuit differs little from
the other circuits. Though one might disagree with the court’s conclusions
concerning the strength of the Fifth and First Amendment claims, it fully
adjudicated each one, applying the requisite jurisprudence and tests.167 In
addition, because the plaintiffs could have prevailed solely on the regulatory
takings claim or the free speech claim, the plaintiffs did not need the hybrid
rights exception.

162. Thomas, 165 F.3d at 710.
163. Id. at 714.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. The dissent argued that Thomas lacked standing on the Fifth Amendment claim,
because the statute took effect well before he entered the residential rental market. Id. at 725.
So, he knew the law would restrain his right to exclude. Id. In addition, the dissent argued the
speech in question was commercial speech, subject to the Central-Hudson test. Id. at 726. It
also took issue with the court’s analysis of hybrid rights, and advocated an approach “consistent with principles of judicial restraint.” Id. at 723. It suggested that a court should only
consider the hybrid rights exception when confronted with a case paralleling one of the cases
distinguished by Smith. Id. As previously noted, the Ninth Circuit subsequently reviewed this
case en banc and held the claim was not justiciable. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights
Comm’n, 220 F.3d. 1134, 1137–38 (9th Cir. 2000). It also chose to take no position on the
hybrid rights exception until the Supreme Court could clarify the issue. Id. at 1147–48. Despite this decision, courts in the Ninth Circuit continue to apply the colorable claim approach.
See Am. Family Ass’n, Inc. v. City and Cty. of S. F., 277 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2002); Every
Nation Campus Ministries v. Achtenberg, 597 F.Supp.2d 1075 (S.D. Cal. 2009); Jacobs v.
Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 373 F.Supp.2d 1162 (D. Nev. 2005);
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The “Cabining” Approach: Some Courts Limit Hybrid Rights to
Certain Claims

To avoid these issues, some commentators propose a “cabining” approach.168 One might argue that, to some extent, the First Circuit follows this
kind of approach.169 Whereas the independent viability and colorable claim
approaches set forth broad rules, “cabining” forges a very narrow path.170 It
restricts the hybrid rights doctrine to claims and fact patterns that quite
closely resemble the cases distinguished in Smith, like Wisconsin v. Yoder.171
Most of the courts who have applied this approach would find a free
exercise/parental right hybrid only in cases with facts similar to Yoder.172
More specifically, courts will apply strict scrutiny only when litigants prove
that the government has substantially interfered with their ability to pass
their religious beliefs and practices to their children.173
In essence, this approach does not differ from an outright rejection.
For, though the Second Circuit has refused to recognize the hybrid rights
exception, it still applies Yoder when the facts of the case require it. The
only difference between the First Circuit and the Second Circuit is that the
First Circuit applies Yoder in the name of a free exercise/parental rights hybrid, and the Second Circuit applies Yoder without reference to hybrid
rights, as shown by the following examples.

168. The Best of a Bad Lot, supra note 6, at 1495.
169. Id. at 1507.
170. Id. at 1495.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1513. While most cases implicate Yoder, the Fifth Circuit decided a hybrid
rights case similar to Barnette and Wooley. In that case, potential juror, Robin MurrayO’Hair, an atheist, refused to take the required pre-voir dire oath because it included a reference to God. Soc’y of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman, 939 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir. 1991).
The judge jailed her for contempt. Id. She sued, alleging a violation of her free exercise right.
Id. The court held that a God-free affirmation is a “religious statement.” Id. Citing Barnette
and Wooley, the court explained that the Constitution protected the right to refrain from
speaking when to do so would be morally objectionable. Id. at 1215. Though these principles
are “bottomed on the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause,” they “developed in response
to religiously-motivated objections to coerced speech.” Id. Because Smith reaffirmed “[that
the] government may not compel affirmation of religious belief,” the Free Exercise Clause
protected Murray-O’Hair. Id. at 1216. Though the court granted declaratory relief, it also held
that Judge Herman was immune from suit. Id. at 1211. The Fifth Circuit overturned this
decision en banc, holding Murray-O’Hair lacked standing. Id. at 1284.
173. The Best of a Bad Lot, supra note 6, at 1500–01.
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First Circuit: Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions and
Parker v. Hurley

For a number of years, commentators put the First Circuit in the independent viability camp, primarily due to the court’s analysis of hybrid rights
in Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions.174 In Brown, the fifteen-yearold plaintiffs attended a required program on AIDS awareness, where the
leader of the program subjected them to “sexually explicit monologues” and
“sexually suggestive skits.”175 The parents and children sued, asserting a
parental rights/free exercise hybrid.176 After separately analyzing the parental rights contention, the court rejected the hybrid rights claim for two reasons: first, the free exercise right did not conjoin with an “independently
protected” constitutional right; and second, unlike Yoder, a one-time compulsory attendance at an assembly did not “threaten their entire way of
life.”177 Thereafter, commentators assumed the First Circuit would take an
independent viability approach, because it required the companion right to
be “independently protected.”178
However, the First Circuit disputed that categorization in Parker v.
Hurley, another parental rights/free exercise case.179 In Parker, two parents
sued a Massachusetts school district, because teachers subjected their children to books depicting same-sex couples in a positive manner.180 This offended their religious beliefs about homosexuality.181 The First Circuit
seemed to reserve the right to develop its approach to hybrid rights more
fully.182 At the same time, it suggested a successful hybrid rights claim
would have to resemble one of the cases distinguished in Smith, particularly
Yoder.183 The court held that the burden on the parents’ free exercise rights
in Parker did not rise to the level of that in Yoder.184

174. 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1159 (1996).
175. Id. at 529.
176. Id. at 539.
177. Id.
178. The Best of a Bad Lot, supra note 6, at 1507.
179. Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 98, n.9 (1st Cir. 2008); The Best of a Bad Lot, supra
note 6, at 1507.
180. Parker, 514 F.3d at 90.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 99; see also, The Best of a Bad Lot, supra note 6, at 1508.
183. Parker, 514 F.3d at 99.
184. Id.
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The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina: Hicks v. The Halifax Board of Education

Hicks v. The Halifax Board of Education, a case decided by a district
court in the Eastern District of North Carolina, offers an example of a more
developed “cabining” approach.185 In Hicks, elementary school officials suspended Aaron Ganues because he would not comply with the school’s uniform policy.186 His great-grandmother (and legal guardian) believed that, by
wearing the school uniform, Aaron would be showing an allegiance to the
Antichrist, a being who required conformity.187 The school district filed a
motion for summary judgment, arguing that under Smith, the plaintiffs had
to comply with the uniform policy, because it was a neutral, generally applicable rule.188 To the contrary, Ms. Hicks argued that her claim warranted
strict scrutiny because it consisted of a parental rights/free exercise hybrid.189 The court agreed with Ms. Hicks.190
The “‘hybrid’ path of parental religious freedom left narrowly open by
[Smith],” the court contended, required that the “character of the interference” closely resemble that in Yoder and Pierce.191 The court acknowledged
that Ms. Hicks had the constitutional right to direct her child’s upbringing in
a manner consistent with her religious beliefs.192 The court stated, “[a]t stake
in this case is Hicks’ ability to impress upon her great-grandson the truth
and importance of her religious beliefs, specifically those beliefs regarding
185. 93 F.Supp.2d 649 (N.D.N.C. 1999). The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit has not taken a clear approach to the hybrid rights exception, though it has
acknowledged its validity. See Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464,
473 (8th Cir. 1991). Two district courts in the Eighth Circuit, however, seem to apply a “cabining” approach. For example, in The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas, a plaintiff objected to the administration of the Hepatitis B vaccine to her daughter
for religious reasons. Boone v. Boozman, 217 F.Supp.2d 938, 942 (E.D. Ark. 2002). The
plaintiff did not qualify for the religious exemption under the statute, because she was not a
member of a recognized religion with tenets against vaccination. Id. at 943. The court held
that her claim did not meet the hybrid rights exception, because it did not fit Pierce or Yoder.
Id. at 955. Likewise, in Spiering v. Heineman, Scientologists wanted to keep the hospital
from testing their newborn for metabolic disorders, because it would involve a needle prick.
448 F.Supp.2d 1129, 1132 (D. Neb. 2006). Their religion required them to insulate their child
from pain for a period of seven days after birth. Id. They asserted a parental rights/free exercise hybrid. Id. at 1139. The court contended that the hybrid rights exception applied only in
cases similar to Yoder. Id. Thus, it would not apply the exception to the plaintiffs’ claim,
because the claim had nothing to do with the education of their child. Id.
186. Hicks, 93 F. Supp.2d at 652.
187. Id. at 653.
188. Id. at 657.
189. Id. at 659.
190. See id. at 669.
191. Id. at 656.
192. Hicks, 93 F.Supp.2d at 659.
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the preparation for salvation.”193 The court held Ms. Hick’s case closely
resembled Yoder.194 As a result, the court applied strict scrutiny to the school
district’s policy.195
The analysis in Parker and Hicks is virtually identical to the Second
Circuit’s analysis in Leebaert. All three courts applied Yoder to free exercise/parental rights cases in lieu of Smith’s general rule. All three courts
required the character of the free exercise/parental rights claim to parallel
that in Yoder. The only difference is that one court (the Second Circuit) rejected hybrid rights and the other two did not.
Obviously, the lower courts have struggled to apply the hybrid rights
exception. That explains the various approaches the courts have adopted.
Part IV explains another alternative in lieu of hybrid rights.
IV. FREE EXERCISE AS FREE SPEECH: ADVANTAGES TO SEEKING REFUGE
UNDER THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE IN LIEU OF A HYBRID RIGHTS EXCEPTION
Religious claimants seem to assert the free exercise/free speech hybrid
as often as they assert the free exercise/parental rights hybrid. However, one
could argue that the Free Speech Clause alone may offer sufficient protection to religious litigants. Although the Free Speech Clause was not designed intentionally to protect religious liberties, it has often done so.196 Beginning in the 1940s, when the Supreme Court decided Cantwell, Murdock,
and Barnette, for example, free speech and free exercise often worked handin-hand.197 This likely is because the Court had not yet developed free exercise jurisprudence.198 As a result, free exercise often “piggyback[ed] on the
shoulders” of free speech.199 In those, free speech/free exercise cases in the
1940s, the Court provided religious speech with the same protection as political speech.200
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 663. Despite the district court’s analysis, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit has not taken a position on hybrid rights. See Workman v. Mingo Cty.
Bd. of Educ., 419 Fed. Appx. 348, 353 (4th Cir. 2011) (“We observe that there is a circuit
split over the validity of the ‘hybrid-rights’ exception . . . we do not need to decide this issue
here . . . .”). Likewise, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has no clear
theory on hybrid rights. In its only case addressing the exception, the court stopped short of
advocating any one approach, because it found the companion claims to be “utterly meritless.” Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chi., 342 F.3d 752, 765 (7th Cir. 2003).
196. Mark W. Cordes, Religion as Speech: The Growing Role of Free Speech Jurisprudence in Protecting Religious Liberty, 38 SW. L. REV. 235, 235 (2008).
197. Id. at 238–39; Alan Brownstein, Protecting Religious Liberty: The False Messiahs
of Free Speech Doctrine and Formal Neutrality, 18 J. L. & POL. 119, 125 (2003).
198. Brownstein, supra note 197, at 125.
199. Id. at 125–26.
200. Cordes, supra note 196, at 239.
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In the next forty years, however, free speech and free exercise developed independently of one another.201 Through its free speech jurisprudence,
the Court created a complex doctrinal framework.202 As that framework developed, an important principle emerged—the principle of content neutrality.203 Under this principle, the Court subjected content-based laws, restrictions based on the content or subject matter of the speech, to strict scrutiny.204
In a series of important free-speech decisions, the Rehnquist Court held
that providing equal access to religious speech in a public forum did not
violate the Establishment Clause, because it did not have the primary effect
of promoting religion.205 During that time, the Court treated religion as one
viewpoint among many.206 As such, religion acted as a “co-equal participant” in American public life, and protection for religious speech became
robust.207
In the late 1960s, the Supreme Court provided equally robust protections for free exercise.208 The Free Exercise Clause came into its own in
Sherbert in 1963, and then in Yoder in 1972.209 The Court held in both cases
that significant burdens on free exercise, even if incidental, triggered a
heightened level of review.210
This changed several years later when the Rehnquist Court shifted to
an emphasis on neutrality in Employment Division v. Smith.211 While the
principle of neutrality strengthened protections for religious speech under
the Free Speech Clause, it significantly weakened protections for free exercise.212 As a result, religious litigants began looking to the Free Speech
Clause for protection.213
However, as Professor Thomas McCoy forcefully argued, the Court
has not incorporated its more nuanced free speech jurisprudence into its free
exercise jurisprudence.214 He argues that employing the Supreme Court’s
more fully developed and nuanced standards for evaluating time, place, and
201. Brownstein, supra note 197, at 126.
202. Id.
203. See Cordes, supra note 196, at 240.
204. Id. at 240–41.
205. Id. at 246–47.
206. Id. at 246.
207. Id.
208. Brownstein, supra note 197, at 126.
209. Id.
210. Cordes, supra note 196, at 263.
211. Id. at 266–67.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 267.
214. See Thomas C. McCoy, A Coherent Methodology for First Amendment Speech and
Religion Clause Cases, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1335, 1344 (1995).
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manner restrictions on speech provides a better approach for addressing Free
Exercise Clause claims than the “doctrinal extremes” of applying the Sherbert compelling interest test, or the rational or sub-rational basis test from
Smith.215 This approach should require courts to apply a version of intermediate scrutiny as opposed to strict scrutiny or rational basis.
The courts have not caught up to Professor McCoy’s insights. Jurisprudence under the Free Exercise Clause is still underdeveloped. Thus, it makes
sense for litigants to advance free speech claims rather than religious liberty
claims. A key advantage to advancing a free speech claim is that there is a
broader and more forceful neutrality principle in free speech jurisprudence
than free exercise jurisprudence.216 Under the Free Speech Clause, for example, the government must treat religious speech as equal to secular
speech.217 In Smith, however, the Court opened the door to exemptions that
would benefit the religious litigant.218 The resulting privilege may have left
those statutes vulnerable to attack under the Establishment Clause.219 Thus,
one advantage that the shift from free exercise to free speech offers is that
the neutrality principle set forth in free speech jurisprudence better comports
with the Establishment Clause.
The shift also has other advantages. First, when a neutral law of general
applicability interferes with the free exercise of religion, courts must apply
the low level, rational basis inquiry under Smith.220 However, when a content neutral law interferes with religious speech, the court will apply intermediate scrutiny.221 Thus, if a religious litigant can clear the initial hurdle,
requiring her to prove that her religious practice is a form of expression, she
will receive a heightened level of review.222
Second, in order to gain protection under the Free Exercise Clause, a
litigant must show that a law specifically targets religion.223 The Supreme
Court of the United States has found only one example of this.224 Thus, free

215. Id. at 1364–65.
216. Id.
217. Cordes, supra note 196, at 246.
218. Brownstein, supra note 197, at 168.
219. In Warner v. City of Boca Raton, for example, a federal district court observed that
Florida’s RFRA exempted religious, but not secular conduct from compliance with neutral
laws of general applicability. 64 F.Supp.2d 1272, 1287 n.11 (S.D. Fla. 1999). Such an exemption, it contended, would prove unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause if challenged. Id.
220. Brownstein, supra note 197, at 151.
221. Id.
222. In many instances, this will not be difficult. “[T]here is enough of a speech dimension to many religious activities” to implicate the Free Speech Clause. Id. at 182.
223. Id. at 156.
224. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993).
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exercise jurisprudence only allows a facial challenge to the law.225 To the
contrary, a free speech claim, bolstered by the overbreadth doctrine, allows
the religious claimant to mount an as-applied challenge to the law.226 In other words, the free speech doctrine does not require proof of “religious gerrymander[ing].”227 If the law incidentally restricts a substantial amount of
protected expression, a court will invalidate the law.228
Third, unlike the Free Exercise Clause (along with state RFRAs and
RLUIPA), the Free Speech Clause protects religious speech regardless of
the speaker’s sincerity or motives.229 A religious claimant does not have to
prove the practice in question is central to a sincerely held belief.230 Both the
“sincerity” test and the “substantial burden” test are absent from the free
speech analysis.231 This eliminates a significant obstacle.
V. CONCLUSION
Religious litigants cannot depend on the hybrid rights exception for
protection. The hybrid rights exception under the Free Exercise Clause is
unworkable because courts have not developed a clear definition and application of the exception that substantially differs from outright rejection. So,
whether a court accepts a hybrid rights theory or not, it will treat the hybrid
rights claim essentially the same: (1) if a free exercise/parental rights case
resembles Yoder, the claimant will receive a heightened level of review; or
(2) if the free exercise right is combined with any other constitutional protection, the companion claim will dictate the level of review.
In the twenty-three years since Smith, the Supreme Court has remained
silent on hybrid rights. Perhaps the Smith Court never intended to create a
substantive exception. It merely used hybrid rights to reach its desired result.
And, one might argue that the exception still sits where the Supreme Court
left it, despite efforts to develop it.
Though the hybrid rights exception is unworkable, litigants still have
avenues to advance religious liberty claims. In many cases, individuals turn
to statutory claims under RFRA, RLUIPA, or a state RFRA. The reality is
that there is greater statutory protection for free exercise claims than under
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Furthermore, in many
cases, the Free Speech Clause will provide necessary protection. Character225. Brownstein, supra note 197 at 156.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 148.
230. Id .
231. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 907 (1990)
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
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izing free exercise as free speech has three main advantages: (1) the neutrality principle set forth in free speech jurisprudence better comports with the
Establishment Clause; (2) under free speech, courts will subject content neutral laws that interfere with religious speech to intermediate scrutiny; (3)
free speech doctrine does not limit religious claimants to facial challenges to
the law; and (4) courts do not subject free speech litigants to a “sincerity”
test or to a “substantial burden” test.
As advocates of religious freedom look for protection elsewhere, they
will likely have to choose whether to pursue religious freedom through statutory exemptions or through free speech, because one pursuit may undermine the progress made by the other.232 Such a choice requires advocates to
decide whether the principle of neutrality, as set forth in free speech jurisprudence, is one worth preserving. If so, the path to religious freedom is
clear, and must be sought through free speech jurisprudence.

232. See Cordes, supra note 196.

